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Abstract: The Barents Sea contains some of the most valuable ﬁsh resources in 
the world, including the world’s largest cod stock. Since the mid-1970s, Norway 
and the Soviet Union/Russia have managed the most important stocks in the 
area together, through the Joint Norwegian–Russian Fisheries Commission. 
During the 1990s, the precautionary approach was adopted as the leading de-
vice for global ﬁsheries management, introducing a requirement for additional 
precaution when scientiﬁc evidence is uncertain, as well as a number of practical 
regulatory measures related to scientiﬁc research, regulation and enforcement. 
Since the late 1990s, the Joint Commission has gradually adopted a number of 
measures required by the precautionary approach. Russia has never formally in-
troduced the principle in its own ﬁsheries legislation, but by and large employed 
regulatory measures in line with it. The article presents the major precautionary 
regulatory measures adopted by the Commission, including precautionary ref-
erence points for spawning stocks and ﬁsh mortality, a harvest control rule for 
quota settlement and various enforcement initiatives. A particular focus is on 
Norwegian–Russian collaboration and how Norway has bargained with Russia 
for precautionary management measures.




Since the 200-mile exclusive economic zones (EEZs) were introduced in the mid-
1970s, Norway and the Soviet Union/Russian Federation have managed the ma-
jor fish stocks in the Barents Sea together, through the Joint Norwegian–Russian 
Fisheries Commission. Most importantly, the two parties in 1975 agreed to treat 
the commercially most important fish stocks in the area, cod and haddock, as 
shared stocks, and divide the quotas 50–50 between them. This article takes us 
through Norwegian–Russian fisheries relations since the turn of the millennium, 
focussing on matters where Norway has expressly taken a precautionary stance 
and then attempted to convince Russia to follow suit, notably the introduction of 
the precautionary approach and its operationalization, but also issues related to 
overfishing and scientific methods.1 A chronological presentation of each thematic 
case is provided first. Then a section on bargaining dynamics follows. Here the 
focus is not on the outcomes, but on the processes that led to them. What form did 
Norway’s negotiation efforts take? How were the Norwegian initiatives perceived 
by the Russians? What was eventually achieved?2
Although the article is empirical rather than theoretical in nature, the dis-
cussion is situated within the literature on state compliance with international 
agreements and post-agreement bargaining. In realist and institutionalist litera-
ture, state compliance is, broadly speaking, viewed either as the reflection of state 
interest (it would have complied in any event, or forced by a stronger state to 
comply), or as the result of the design of the regime.3 Realists have not regarded 
state compliance with international obligations as a particularly interesting issue, 
since it is assumed that states generally comply with such obligations. The argu-
ment is that states accept treaties only when their governments have concluded 
that they are in their interest.4 According to institutionalists, the picture is more 
complex. It is argued that a regime can be designed so as to enhance compli-
ance, and that negotiation does not end with the conclusion of a treaty. Disputes 
can be resolved, ambiguities in the treaty text clarified, and compliance induced 
1. The article builds on Hønneland (2013), but is significantly shortened, revised and updated.
2. The empirical presentation builds mainly on protocols from the Joint Commission and its 
Permanent Committee, and my own (participant) observation in the Norwegian Coast Guard, 
the Joint Commission and the Permanent Committee during the period 1988–2000, as an 
interpreter and fishery inspector. I also build on interviews carried out for my anniversary 
publication for the Joint Commission on its 30th anniversary (Hønneland, 2006), for a research 
project on knowledge disputes in Russian fisheries science (Aasjord and Hønneland, 2008), 
and post-agreement bargaining in the Barents Sea (Hønneland, 2013).
3. See Burgstaller (2005) for an overview of this literature.
4. See, for instance, Morgenthau (1948) or Henkin (1968).
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through negotiations after the treaty has been concluded (Mitchell, 1994; Chayes 
and Chayes, 1995; Weiss and Jacobsen, 1998). Jönsson and Tallberg (1998) attempt 
to bridge the gap between the compliance literature and bargaining theory in IR 
by introducing the concept of ‘post-agreement bargaining’. The literature has seen 
compliance either as an enforcement problem (realist or neoclassical theory), or a 
management problem (institutionalist theory), while negotiation theory has been 
preoccupied with the processes leading up to the signing of an agreement. The 
literature on compliance focuses on member-state actions in the post-agreement 
phase, while neglecting dynamic processes like bargaining. Negotiation theory, 
on the other hand, emphasizes processes, but fails to extend this attention to the 
post-agreement phase. The post-agreement bargaining concept hence bridges these 
two approaches. As Spector and Zartman (2003) state, post-agreement bargaining 
is all about ‘getting it done’. In this article, we ask how Norway has gone about 
getting it done in its attempts to encourage Russia to agree on new precautionary 
management principles and practices in the Barents Sea fisheries.
2. The precautionary approach and quota settlement
In the latter half of the 1990s, cod quotas in the Barents Sea were at an all-time 
high, peaking with a TAC (total allowable catch) of 850,000 tonnes in 1997 – fol-
lowing a gradual increase since the all-time low of 160,000 tonnes in 1990. At the 
time, marine scientists suspected that their models implied inflated estimates of 
stock size, and reduced their estimate of total stock size by 200,000 tonnes. In the 
following two years, the TAC was reduced to 654,000 tonnes and 480,000 tonnes, 
respectively.
At the same time, the precautionary approach was adopted by both ICES (the 
International Council for the Exploration of the Sea) and the Joint Commission. 
This principle emerged in various regional environmental agreements during the 
1980s and became established at the global level in the 1992 Rio Declaration,5 
and subsequently in fisheries-related declarations and treaties such as the UN 
Fish Stocks Agreement6 and the FAO (Food and Agricultural Organization of the 
5. It was also included in new global environmental treaties adopted in Rio, such as the 
Biodiversity Convention and the Climate Convention; see Andresen et al. (2012).
6. “Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management 
of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks”, New York, 4 August 1995, 
International Legal Materials, pp. 1547–1580.
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United Nations) Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries7, both from 1995. The 
essence of the precautionary approach is that lack of scientific knowledge should 
not be used as a reason for failing to undertake management measures that could 
prevent the degradation of the environment or the depletion of common-pool 
resources. Whereas it was once considered reasonable to take such measures only 
when it was established with a high degree of certainty that the environment or 
resource basis would be seriously threatened without such interference, the intro-
duction of the precautionary approach turned the burden of proof upside-down: 
preventive measures should be postponed or omitted only when there was full 
scientific certainty that they were not necessary.
Both the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries and the UN Fish 
Stocks Agreement prescribe the use of stock-specific reference points as a tool 
to deal with matters of risk and uncertainty in fisheries management. The latter 
defines a precautionary reference point as ‘an estimated value derived through an 
agreed scientific procedure, which corresponds to the state of the resource and 
of the fishery, and which can be used as a guide for fisheries management.’8 Two 
types of reference points are singled out: limit reference points and target reference 
points. While the former set absolute limits to what is considered to be acceptable, 
the latter imply management goals to aim at. Management strategies are expected 
to seek to maintain or restore stocks at levels consistent with the agreed-upon tar-
get reference point, and to include measures that can be implemented when refe-
rence points are approached. It should be a goal for fisheries management systems 
to ensure that, on average and over time, target reference points are not exceeded. 
Precautionary reference points are normally set for the size of the spawning stock 
and for fishing mortality, i.e. the share of the stock that perishes for natural rea-
sons or is caught.
In 1996, ICES started work on elaborating reference points for the commer-
cially exploited fish stocks in the northeast Atlantic. Two years later, reference 
points were set for the Northeast Arctic cod stock: the target reference point for 
the spawning stock was set at 500,000 tonnes, the limit reference point at 112,000 
tonnes (which was the lowest observed in the 53-year time series). For fishing mor-
tality, the target reference point was identified as 0.42, the limit reference point 
as 0.70. This implied that the management of the Northeast Arctic cod was held 
to be in accordance with the precautionary approach only as long as the stock’s 
spawning mass was greater than 500,000 tonnes and the fishing mortality lower 
7. Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, signed in Rome, 28 September 1995, Rome: UN 
Food and Agriculture Organization.
8. Ibid., Annex II, Para. I.
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than 0.42 on average over an unspecified number of years. Crisis level was reached 
if the spawning stock fell below 112,000 tonnes or if fishing mortality reached 0.70.
In Norway, the precautionary approach was incorporated in official fishery 
policy through a White Paper in 1997;9 in Russia, this principle is still not found in 
fisheries legislation or policy documents.10 The Joint Commission never explicitly 
adopted the precautionary approach as such, but gradually introduced it around 
the turn of the millennium by adapting its policies to ICES recommendations and 
technical (if not declaratory) terminology. In the protocol from its 1997 session, 
the Commission noted:
The parties agreed on the need to develop further long-term strategies for the man-
agement of the joint stocks of the Barents Sea. Until such a strategy is available for 
cod, the parties agreed that the annual total quota is to be established so that the 
spawning stock is maintained above 500,000 tonnes at the same time as the fishing 
mortality in the next years is reduced to less than […] 0.46.11
The same paragraph was used in the protocol from the 1998 session, with the 
specification that fishing mortality should be reduced to no less than 0.46 by no 
later than 2001. In the protocol from the 1999 session, the old technical term Fmed 
(safe biological limit for fishing mortality) was replaced by Fpa (fishing mortality 
precautionary – i.e. target – reference point) and the aimed-at catch-rate level was 
reduced from 0.46 to 0.42, i.e. brought into accordance with the precautionary re-
commendation from ICES. In 2000, the Commission requested ICES to reconsider 
the precautionary reference point for the spawning stock in light of the dynamics 
of the cod stock over the preceding 30 to 40 years. Although the wording of the 
letter urged the scientific body to ‘reconsider’ the reference point, it is clear that 
both the Russian Government and the Joint Commission were in fact calling for 
a reduction. In 2001, ICES complied with this request and lowered the target refe-
rence point for the spawning stock to 460,000 tonnes. At the same time, however, 
the limit reference point was increased to 220,000 tonnes. Further, the target refe-
rence point for fishing mortality was reduced to 0.40, which meant that require-
ments to precaution became stricter. On the other hand, the limit reference point 
was raised to 0.74, so here the room for manoeuvre became wider.
9. St.meld. nr. 51 (1997–98) Perspektiver på norsk fiskerinæring, Oslo: Stortinget, 1997.
10. See Jørgensen (2009) for overviews of Russian fisheries legislation. The 2004 Federal Fisheries 
Act defines the concept of ‘protection and rational use’ of aquatic biological resources as the 
main goal of Russian fisheries management.
11. Protokoll for den 26. sesjon i Den blandete norsk-russiske fiskerikommisjon, Oslo: Ministry 
of Fisheries, 1997, p. 2.
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As we have seen, there was a significant downward trend in the Barents Sea cod 
quotas in 1998 and 1999, but quotas were still at a reasonably high level. Then in 
autumn 1999, ICES sounded the alarm: not only had their models shown inflated 
estimates of the Barents Sea cod stock; the stock had actually dropped to an alarm-
ing level. Spawning stock biomass was believed to be down at 222,000 tonnes, less 
than half that prescribed by the target reference point and approaching the limit 
reference point. (This was practically at the new limit reference point established 
two years later, which by implication is an extremely serious situation for the fish 
stock.) Seen from the outside, if there ever was a time to make use of the precau-
tionary approach, it was now. ICES’ primary TAC recommendation for 2000 – in-
tended to restore the spawning stock to acceptable levels within three years – was 
110,000 tonnes, nearly five times less than the 1999 quota. The Joint Commission 
arrived at 390,000 tonnes, almost four times above scientific recommendations. 
The following statement is found in the protocol from this session: “The Norwegian 
party notes that the level of the cod quota is alarmingly high in consideration 
of the available stock assessments and the recommendations from ICES. Taking 
into account the difficult conditions of the population of northwestern Russia 
[…], Norway has nevertheless found it possible to enter into this agreement.”12 
It was clear that precaution had not prevailed in the Joint Commission, and that 
the Norwegian side was disappointed. Details follow in the section on bargaining 
dynamics below.
The next year, the Joint Commission made an unexpected move: it established 
a TAC for three years ahead. This quota was slightly above the quota for 2000 
(395,000 tonnes) and was to be applied for 2001, 2002 and 2003, unless the stock 
situation became worse than expected (in which case the TAC could be reduced) 
or the precautionary (target) reference points for spawning stock and fishing mor-
tality were reached before the end of 2003 (then the TAC could be increased). The 
three-year element was obviously intended to provide greater predictability. The 
fishing industries of Norway and Russia were given better opportunities to plan 
for the immediate future, and those who feared for the health of the cod stock were 
given assurances that the TAC would not increase even further unless manage-
ment objectives had been achieved. Judged by the standards of the precautionary 
approach, however, much was left to be desired. ICES had recommended a TAC 
of 263,000 tonnes, and in summer 2001 it declared that fishing mortality of the 
Barents Sea cod stock could have been as high as 0.9 in 2000.13 Even the most pes-
12. Protokoll for den 28. sesjon i Den blandete norsk-russiske fiskerikommisjon, Oslo: Ministry 
of Fisheries, 1999, Art. 5.1.
13. Nordlys, 6 June 2001.
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simistic estimates during the Joint Commission’s session in November 2000 did 
not go beyond 0.5.
The new invention announced at the Commission’s session in 2002 had far 
wider implications for the further work of the Joint Commission: a harvest control 
rule for cod and haddock. The rule consisted of three elements: i) average fishing 
mortality should be kept below the target reference point for each three-year pe-
riod; ii) the TAC should not change by more than 10 per cent from one year to the 
next for cod and 25 per cent for haddock; but iii) exceptions could be made when 
the spawning stock was below the target reference point. Again we see both bio-
logical viability and economic predictability addressed: fishing mortality should 
be within the precautionary reference point on average for any three-year period, 
and the fishing industry was secured against large fluctuations in the TAC as long 
as the spawning stock was above the precautionary reference point. The harvest 
control rule changed the working form of the Commission. Previously, delegation 
leaders had spent nearly all their time during sessions negotiating the TACs, and 
agreement was normally reached only at the very end of a session. Now setting 
the TAC became more of a technical matter, which could be dealt with sooner 
rather than later. Perhaps to demonstrate the usefulness of the harvest control 
rule, the Commission now made a habit of announcing the next year’s TAC just 
a day or two after it convened. As a result, delegation leaders could devote more 
time and energy to other pressing issues, up till then largely taken care of by the 
Commission’s working groups. The harvest control rule was evaluated by ICES in 
2005 and found to be in agreement with the precautionary approach. A precondi-
tion was that fishing should be brought to a halt – not just reduced – if the spawn-
ing stock fell below the limit reference point of 220,000 tonnes.
The cod stock recovered well and the TAC increased gradually during the 2000s, 
exceeding 600,000 tonnes at the end of the decade. The Joint Commission stuck 
to its harvest control rule until 2009, when it decided to increase the cod quota 
by more than 10 per cent and justified the move by referring to the satisfactory 
state of the stock. The spawning stock was actually above one million tonnes at 
the time.14 Simultaneously, the Commission added to the harvest control rule that 
fishing mortality should not be below 0.30. Implicitly it should be possible to in-
crease the cod TAC by more than 10 per cent if a quota change within 10 per cent 
would imply fishing mortality below 0.30. In 2010, ICES evaluated the revision 
14. ICES Advice 2010. Book 3: The Barents and the Norwegian Sea, Copenhagen: International 
Council for the Exploration of the Sea, 2010, p. 6. Spawning stock biomass had been above 
the target reference point (460,000 tonnes) since 2002. Fishing mortality had been reduced 
from well above the limit reference point (0.74) around the turn of the millennium to well 
below the target reference point (0.40) since 2006.
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of the harvest control rule and deemed it to be precautionary. The same year the 
Joint Commission declared that the revised harvest control rule would be used for 
setting the TAC five years ahead, and then re-evaluated. The cod TAC continued 
to increase to 724,000 tonnes for 2011 – again an increase beyond 10 per cent, but 
now in compliance with the revised harvest control rule approved by ICES. For 
2013, TAC for the first time exceeded 1 million tonnes.
3. Overfishing
Disagreement between Norway and Russia around the turn of the millennium 
about the level of TACs was solved more easily than both parties had probably 
feared in 1999. With that problem out of the way, however, a new one emerged, 
at least seen from the Norwegian side. Ever since the enforcement cooperation 
between the two countries had been established in 1993 as a response to Russian 
overfishing in 1992–93, there had been little attention to possible discrepancies 
between the established TAC and actual catches. The Joint Commission seemed to 
assume that overfishing had been eliminated once the Norwegian enforcement au-
thorities started to submit data about Russian landings in Norway to their Russian 
counterparts. The established routines for enforcement cooperation were codified 
in a memorandum signed at the Commission’s session in 2000,15 but new chal-
lenges were underway. At the meeting of the Permanent Committee under the 
Joint Commission in October that year, the parties noted that “an extensive tran-
shipment [of fish] takes place at sea and agreed that this activity is not subject to 
sufficient control by the parties.”16 While most northwest Russian vessels had been 
bringing their fish to Norwegian ports since the early 1990s, the old Soviet practice 
of transhipping fish to transport vessels at sea was resumed. Only now the trans-
port vessels did not go to Murmansk with the fish (as they had in Soviet times), but 
to other Western countries, like the UK, Denmark, the Netherlands, Portugal and 
Spain. This was made possible by the gradual upgrading of the northwest Russian 
fishing fleet to factory trawlers. While fresh fish needs to be landed relatively of-
ten – and implicitly to a port close to the fishing ground – frozen products can be 
kept on board for months, and transported over long distances.
After the Permanent Committee had first pointed at this possible new enforce-
ment challenge in 2000, it was instructed by the Joint Commission to investigate 
15. Protokoll for den 29. sesjon i Den blandede norsk-russiske fiskerikommisjon, Oslo: Ministry 
of Fisheries, 2000, Art. 13.2.1.
16. Protokoll fra møte i Det permanente utvalg for forvaltnings- og kontrollspørsmål på fisker-




the possibilities for further harmonization of the parties’ reporting routines, in-
cluding exchange of data about their deliveries of fish to third countries. Little 
came out of this. In 2002, the parties to the Commission declared that they would 
“cooperate to produce complete information about landings in third countries”.17 
Further, the protocol said that “the Norwegian party requested such information 
from the Russian party” and that “the Russian party informed that it will continue 
work to produce data about landings in third countries”.18 The following year, the 
parties “discussed information about unregistered catch of cod in the Barents Sea 
and the Norwegian Sea”.19 By 2004, the wording had become tougher: “With both 
parties acknowledging that a considerable unregistered catch takes place in the 
Barents Sea, it is a prioritized goal to use all possible means to reveal and prevent 
these illegalities.”20 Following up proposals from the Permanent Committee, the 
Joint Commission adopted a number of measures that would intensify reporting 
and control requirements related to transhipment at sea: among other things, the 
obligation for fishing vessels to submit specific reports about all such tranship-
ments, the obligation of transport vessels to have satellite tracking devices on 
board if they receive fish through transhipments at sea, and the prohibition against 
transhipment of fish to transport vessels sailing under flags of convenience.21 At 
the Commission’s session in 2005, the parties agreed to “continue and ensure 
the full implementation of measures adopted at the [2004] session”,22 indicating 
that implementation so far was less than satisfactory. In 2006, the Commission 
reported that some of the measures agreed upon the previous year had been im-
plemented, others not. Perhaps most ominously, “the [joint Norwegian–Russian] 
analysis group that is to put together information at vessel level to reveal possible 
violations of fisheries regulations has not met during 2006.”23 And further, “the 
sub-committee [on enforcement challenges] under the Permanent Committee […] 
has not functioned according to its purpose as there has not been participation 
17. Protokoll for den 31. sesjon i Den blandete norsk-russiske fiskerikommisjon, Oslo: Ministry 
of Fisheries, 2002, Art. 4.
18. Ibid.
19. Protokoll for den 32. sesjon i Den blandete norsk-russiske fiskerikommisjon, Oslo: Ministry 
of Fisheries, 2003, Art. 4.
20. Protokoll for den 33. sesjon i Den blandete norsk-russiske fiskerikommisjon, Oslo: Ministry 
of Fisheries, 2004, Art. 4.
21. Ibid., Art. 12.5.
22. Protokoll for den 34. sesjon i Den blandete norsk-russiske fiskerikommisjon, Oslo: Ministry 
of Fisheries, 2005, Art. 12.5.
23. Protokoll for den 35. sesjon i Den blandete norsk-russiske fiskerikommisjon, Oslo: Ministry 
of Fisheries, 2006, Art. 12.1.
geir hønneland
84
from all relevant authorities on the Russian side.”24 The same formulations ap-
pear in the protocol from 2007, with the additional information that the Russian 
side had failed to appoint a leader to the Permanent Committee’s sub-committee 
on enforcement (which, therefore, did not meet that year either). There was, how-
ever, some good news too: “the parties are pleased to observe indications that the 
amount of overfishing has been reduced in 2007, among other things as a result of 
the introduction of the NEAFC port state regime from 1 May 2007”.25 The same 
formulation is found the two following years, while in 2010 overfishing seems to 
have been brought to a halt: “The Russian party noted that official fishery statistics 
show that no overfishing has taken place of Russian quotas of cod and haddock 
in the Barents Sea and the Norwegian Sea in 2009.”26 At its session in 2009, the 
Commission agreed on a joint Norwegian–Russian method for estimating the total 
catch in the Barents Sea, based on data from satellite tracking and information 
about transport and landings of fish products.
What is the story behind these protocol formulations? In 2002, the Norwegian 
Directorate of Fisheries stepped up its efforts to estimate actual Russian catches 
in the Barents Sea. This unilateral move was the result of what was perceived as 
lack of interest on the Russian side in the new enforcement challenges (see sec-
tion on bargaining dynamics below). An entire new section was built up at the 
Directorate, recruiting new personnel among experts on economic crime. The sec-
tion worked systematically on mapping all activity by Russian fishing and trans-
port vessels in the Barents Sea, availing itself of catch reports, satellite tracking 
data and observations of Russian landings in various third countries.27 On the 
basis of this information, ICES estimated unreported catches of Northeast Arctic 
cod as follows: 90,000 tonnes in 2002, 115,000 tonnes in 2003, 117,000 tonnes in 
2004, 166,000 tonnes in 2005 and 127,000 tonnes in 2006.28 These figures implied 
an annual overfishing in the range of 25–40 per cent of the TAC during the period. 
In other words, the Russians had been overfishing their national cod quotas by 50 
to 80 per cent annually. The Russian fishery authorities, however, did not accept 
Norwegian assertions that the problem was so severe. In autumn 2006, they ad-
24. Ibid.
25. Protokoll for den 36. sesjon i Den blandete norsk-russiske fiskerikommisjon, Oslo. Ministry 
of Fisheries, 2007, Art. 5.1.
26. Protokoll for den 39. sesjon i Den blandete norsk-russiske fiskerikommisjon, Oslo: Ministry 
of Fisheries, 2010, Art. 5.
27. The reports of the Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries about Russian catches in the Barents 
Sea from 2002 to 2008 are available on the Directorate’s website www.fiskeridir.no.
28. ICES Advice 2010. Book 3: The Barents and the Norwegian Sea, Copenhagen: International 
Council for the Exploration of the Sea, 2010, p. 12.
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mitted not knowing how much fish was actually transferred at sea and delivered 
to third countries, but estimated Russian overfishing to be around 20,000–30,000 
tonnes annually.29 According to the Norwegian estimates, overfishing was signifi-
cantly reduced in the following years: to approximately 41,000 tonnes in 2007 and 
15,000 tonnes in 2008.30
While in the protocol from its 2010 session, the Joint Commission indicated 
that overfishing was eradicated through the joint efforts between Norway and 
Russia, there is general agreement – among experts and in the Norwegian public 
– that the solution of the problem to a larger extent can be ascribed to the 2007 
NEAFC (North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission) port state regime (Stokke, 
2009, 2012).31 Under this regime – to which both Norway and Russia are parties 
– members are not to allow an NEAFC vessel to land or tranship frozen fish in 
its port unless the flag state of the vessel confirms that the vessel has sufficient 
quota, has reported the catch and is authorized to fish in the area, and that satel-
lite tracking information data correspond with the vessel report. Fifteen per cent 
of all landings are to be checked physically. NEAFC has also created black-lists of 
vessels not flying the flag of a state participating in the port-state regime that have 
been observed fishing in the NEAFC Convention Area (including the Barents Sea) 
without certain evidence that the fish were caught in compliance with NEAFC 
rules. Such vessels may not land fish to member states or tranship fish to vessels 
from member states.
Hence, around the turn of the millennium, Russian fishers were, to an increas-
ing extent, delivering their catches to transport vessels at sea. The transport ves-
sels largely landed the fish in third countries, in the UK and on the European 
29. This rough number figured in conversations with Russian fishery bureaucrats and in 
Norwegian media at the time. According to the protocol from the Joint Commission’s ses-
sion in 2006 – the only protocol during the 2000s where the amounts of overfishing are 
mentioned – the Russian side estimated the Russian overfishing in 2005 to have been 26,000 
tonnes. Russia subsequently supplied ICES with estimates of Russian overfishing during the 
years 2002–2007. According to these figures, overfishing ranged between 20,000 and 30,000 
tonnes the first three years in this period, peaking at 41,000 tonnes in 2005, before it was re-
duced to 28,000 tonnes in 2006 and 8,757 tonnes in 2007. See ICES Advice 2010. Book 3: The 
Barents and the Norwegian Sea, Copenhagen: International Council for the Exploration of 
the Sea, 2010, p. 12.
30. ICES Advice 2010. Book 3: The Barents and the Norwegian Sea, Copenhagen: International 
Council for the Exploration of the Sea, 2010, p. 12. See also the reports of the Norwegian 
Directorate of Fisheries about Russian catches in the Barents Sea from 2002 to 2008 at www.
fiskeridir.no.
31. See also Statusrapport for 2008: Russisk uttak av nordøst arktisk torsk og hyse, Bergen: 
Directorate of Fisheries, 2008.
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continent. At least in theory, they could now escape the established enforcement 
routines between Norway and Russia, as there were no agreements on exchange of 
landing data with the third countries in question. While such agreements gradu-
ally emerged during the 2000s – especially between Norway and various third 
countries – enforcement of Russian quota regulations ultimately rests with the 
Russian authorities. The Norwegian authorities can punish a Russian vessel for 
underreporting catch (i.e. for having more fish on board than indicated in the catch 
log at the time of inspection), but not for overfishing its annual quota. During 
the 2000s, the Joint Commission had difficulties agreeing on measures to close 
the window of opportunity that had opened for fishers to land fish above quota 
levels; not least, it had difficulties implementing the measures once they were 
adopted. The enforcement problem was finally solved through multilateral action 
in NEAFC, with both Norway and Russia on board.
4. New Russian methods for estimating fish stocks
The collaboration between Norwegian and Russian marine scientists is often re-
ferred to as the core of the bilateral regime. For one thing, the scientific compo-
nent of the Norwegian–Russian partnership on fisheries management is the one 
with the longest history.32 While collaboration on fisheries regulation started in 
1975 and on enforcement in 1993, the first steps towards scientific cooperation 
had been taken as early as in the late nineteenth century.33 However, it was only 
in the 1960s that the Norwegian–Russian/Soviet marine scientific cooperation 
was formalized.34
Around the mid-2000s, a schism in Russian fisheries science became evident, 
through attacks by the federal fisheries research institute, VNIRO, on ICES and 
the regional institute in the Russian northwest, PINRO. Russia’s regional fisher-
ies research institutes became formally independent of VNIRO in the early 1990s, 
though their scientific work is still reviewed by the federal institute. At the same 
time, PINRO’s relations with the Norwegian Institute of Marine Research ex-
panded, in line with relaxed East–West relations in the European Arctic more 
widely – and substantial Norwegian funds to support a ‘starving’ bureaucracy in 
Russia’s northwest. VNIRO had not become part of the international scientific 
community in ICES to the same extent as PINRO (and had not received financial 
support from Norway as the regional institute had), and now VNIRO scientists be-
32. See Jakobsen and Ozhigin (2011) for an overview of the Norwegian–Russian fisheries research 
cooperation.
33. Serebryakov and Solemdal (2002).
34. Røttingen et al. (2007).
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gan to question the scientific credibility of the models ICES employed in assessing 
fish stocks of the Barents Sea. The schism is not mentioned in the protocols from 
the Joint Commission, but from the early 2000s complaints by VNIRO scientists 
about ICES models became “annual performances” at the plenary sessions of the 
Commission, as expressed by one member of the Norwegian delegation. At first, 
VNIRO seemed to lack legitimacy in the Russian delegation, at least in its upper 
echelons, but by the second half of the 2000s Norwegian scientists started to fear 
that VNIRO’s approach would actually prevail on the Russian side.
According to VNIRO, the relationship between recruitment to the stock and the 
size of the spawning stock was given too much weight in ICES models; environ-
mental factors such as natural fluctuations caused by swings in temperature and 
ocean currents were considered to be far more important. Hence, there is no need 
to be so preoccupied with keeping the spawning stock at a specific level. In the 
preface to a report from a joint Norwegian–Russian scientific workshop in 2006, 
VNIRO’s director stated: “[the] use of completely unreal models which are based 
on recruitment dependence on abundance of the spawning stock could be treated 
as prophesying voodooism rather than developing scientifically-based assessments 
of the state and dynamics of the fish stocks”.35
A central point in VNIRO’s criticism of ICES is found in the latter’s own figures 
of the catch pressure on (or fishing mortality of) Northeast Arctic cod. Except for 
a very short period around 1990, fishing mortality since the 1950s has been well 
above the level that ICES has defined as necessary to stay below in order to secure 
long-term viability of the stock, i.e. the target reference point. Since the 1970s, 
fishing mortality has largely been on or above the limit reference point, which ac-
cording to ICES would represent danger of total collapse of the stock (admittedly 
only for one in twenty theoretical runs of the entire existing time series for the 
stock). Well, the stock hasn’t collapsed. “If the reference points and ICES models 
had been correct, there wouldn’t have been any fish in the Barents Sea today”, one 
VNIRO scientist noted in an interview.36 And he went on: “The only logical ex-
planation of the divergence between ICES’ models and the fact that we still have 
fish in the Barents Sea is that the estimates are wrong. We underestimate the [cod] 
stock, and the reason is to be found in the traditional methods.”37
VNIRO has presented three models as alternatives to the traditional model used 
by ICES, among them the ‘synoptic’ model. These base estimates on catch reports 
35. On Necessity of Improvement of the Russian–Norwegian Management Strategy for Cod in the 
Fisheries in the Barents Sea, Workshop for Discussion of the Joint Management of the Barents 
Sea Cod Stock, Nor-Fishing 2006, Moscow: VNIRO Publishing, 2006, p. 4 (emphasis added).




from the fishing fleet, rather than on data from scientific cruises. Neither catch 
reports nor cruises cover the entire ocean, so the various models contain differ-
ent techniques for generalizing from observed amounts of catch to the prevalence 
of fish in the entire ocean.38 While the alternative models are familiar to ICES, 
they yield significantly higher stock estimates than the traditional model when 
applied to Northeast Arctic cod. This is the crux of the matter for VNIRO: ICES 
syste matically underestimates the cod stock; as a result, the fishing industry loses 
access to significant amounts of fish.
The alternative models were promoted in a draft protocol presented by the 
Russians at a meeting between the Norwegian Minister of Fisheries and the lead-
er of the Russian Federal Fisheries Agency in March 2006,39 as well as the Joint 
Commission. The big question was to what extent VNIRO represented the official 
Russian point of view. The leader of the Norwegian delegation to the Commission 
has repeatedly said that his Russian counterpart has assured him that the new 
methods will not be applied before they have been thoroughly assessed and ac-
cepted by ICES. Norwegian scientists, however, have been more concerned. In May 
2006, scientists from the Norwegian Institute of Marine Research told Norwegian 
media that they felt far from sure that the Russians would not officially promote the 
new methods at the coming session of the Joint Commission: “We’ve been given 
assurance that they will only be used in connection with symposia, but I feel far 
from sure.”40 In our interviews with Norwegian scientists (Aasjord and Hønneland, 
2008), similar concerns were expressed: “The alternative analyses become more 
and more prevalent. They’re like a many-headed ogre. They appear in ever-new 
variants”, one of them said (ibid., p. 303).
In a letter dated 13 October 2006, the Russian Federation requested ICES to 
re-evaluate its Northeast Arctic cod assessment in view of new information that 
had become available since ICES last evaluated the stock a few months earlier.41 
This information included data on Russian transhipments at sea – and the syn-
optic method for estimating the stock size. A group of scientists from Poland, the 
Netherlands and France was appointed for the task, with designated Norwegian 
38. I do not provide further technical details here, as this would have brought us well into the 
natural sciences, and is not necessary for my present argument. For such a presentation, see 
Aasjord and Hønneland (2008) and ICES AFWC Report 2008, Copenhagen: International 
Council for the Exploration of the Sea, 2008, Section 3.9.
39. See Aasjord and Hønneland (2008, pp. 300–301). The draft protocol is on file with my co-
author Bente Aasjord.
40. Fiskeribladet, 23 May 2006.
41. ICES Advice 2006. Book 3: The Barents and the Norwegian Seas, Copenhagen: International 
Council for the Exploration of the Sea, 2006, p. 28.
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and Russian scientists available to assist. According to ICES Advice 2006, there 
was “good agreement between the reviewers”, and they “supported the ICES June 
2006 advice as they did not find the basis for the ‘new’ stock estimate sufficiently 
strong to reject the [Arctic Fisheries Working Group] assessment”.42
The most outspoken criticism, however, has come not from Norway nor from 
ICES, but from VNIRO’s own former daughter institute in Murmansk, PINRO. In 
their response to a VNIRO report that presented the synoptic method,43 a group 
of PINRO researchers44 more than hinted that VNIRO has promoted the method 
for financial rather than scientific reasons: “The alternative method for estima-
tion of stock size has, even if it was conceived by good intentions, in certain cases 
been used as an instrument to redistribute research quotas within the framework 
of existing legislature”.45 The scientific criticism from PINRO is directed mainly 
at VNIRO’s preoccupation with absolute rather than relative figures:
One has to remind them that what it is important to know, with respect to rational 
use of a stock, is not the absolute size of the stock, but how it reacts to the intensity 
of the fishery. It is not so important whether the absolute size of the stock is 1 million 
or 10 million tonnes – what is important is how the stock reacts to a certain catch 
under specific conditions. For example, if an annual catch of 800,000 tonnes from a 
stock of 1 million tonnes makes it possible to maintain a positive tendency in stock 
dynamics – without displacing the structure of the stock – then such a catch level 
can be acceptable. And conversely, if a catch of just 100,000 tonnes from a stock of 
100 million tonnes leads to a strong displacement in the stock’s structure, then one 
has to consider this catch level as too high.46
The PINRO scientists presented their Moscow colleagues as rank amateurs, in-
competent in quantitative analysis:
Until the authors begin to add maximum values of biomass found for different ‘syn-
optic periods’ […], it seems as if one can at least observe a simple logic in their reason-
ing. […] But when one comes to the addition of the different maximum biomasses 
emerging from different time periods, this reminds too much of a pupil’s attempts 
to fit the response to the standard answers in the back of the exercise book. […] One 
is amazed at the authors’ lack of logic or sophisticated reasoning.47
42. Ibid.
43. Borisov et al. (2007).
44. Berenboym et al. (2007).
45. Ibid., p. 28.
46. Ibid., p. 27.




During the 1990s, working relations between Norway and Russia in the Joint 
Commission had been exceptionally good. After the two countries in 1993 had 
agreed to include enforcement in the Joint Commission’s area of work, a number 
of technical regulations were coordinated and new ones jointly introduced, among 
them the introduction of mandatory use of selection grids and satellite tracking. 
Proposals came from Norway and were accepted by the Russian side, and the 
working atmosphere was good. Around 1998, a small change became evident. The 
Russian delegation leader would now routinely open the meetings with a diatribe: 
the Norwegians were discriminating against Russian fishers in their inspection ac-
tivity. Russian fishers were inspected more frequently than fishers from other coun-
tries and more severely punished when violations were revealed. The content of 
these accusations was unexpected for the Norwegian side (although later evidence 
showed they were not completely unfounded),48 but most of all it was the form that 
puzzled the Norwegians. Once the accusation had been delivered, the Russians 
would return to the ‘good working relations’ in the Committee, without further 
mention of the alleged discrimination against Russian fishers. A general assump-
tion emerged in the Norwegian delegation that the Russian delegation leader had 
been ‘instructed by Moscow’ to take a tougher stance in the Permanent Committee.
The Norwegian delegation leader to the Joint Commission at the time explained 
work in the Commission in an interview with me:49 up until 1997–98, negotiations 
with the Russians were rather easy. The scientific recommendations allowed for 
generous TACs, the achievements of the Permanent Committee were considered a 
feather in the hat also for the Joint Commission, and the Russians were generally 
flexible at sessions in the Commission. From 1997–1998, the Russian delegation 
leader’s mandate became more restricted; the Russian delegation was controlled 
by the fishing industry; and it became more difficult for the Norwegian to get the 
Russian party to agree on quota levels in accordance with the scientific recom-
mendations.50 My interviewee emphasized the enforcement cooperation and co-
ordination of technical regulation measures as the most important achievements 
during his time as head of the Norwegian delegation (1989–98). He also under-
scored that the Norwegians always sought to make the Russians feel ownership 
to the measures adopted by the Commission on Norwegian initiative: “The good 
stock situation and the fact that we could set so high TACs gave us time to work 
with other things than quota issues. In order to make the Russians feel ownership 
48. Aftenposten, 18 November 2002.




to the measures it was important that things were taken in several rounds: first in 
the [Permanent Committee] and then in the Commission.”51 He mentioned the 
introduction of compulsory selection grids in cod trawls as particularly challeng-
ing: “The Russians understood the Norwegian intention that the selection grid 
should compensate for the minimum mesh size that we had never succeeded in 
getting them to accept”52 Asked why the Russians accepted the cod selection grid 
at all, he replied: “Well, they’d probably ‘come too far’”. They had already agreed 
to so much. They were still in the game, but more hesitant.’53 Another member of 
the Norwegian delegation’s ‘inner circle’ at the time also emphasized the gradual 
introduction of selection grids: the selection grid for shrimp came in the early 
1990s, and Russian scientists came on board in the preparation of introduction of 
grids in the cod fishery, which increased their sense of ownership to the issue.54
These interviewees admitted that for Norway the selection grids were a way to 
circumvent Russian reluctance to increasing the minimum allowable mesh size 
and length of fish or shrimp. They also described the introduction of mandatory 
grids in cod trawls in 1997 as the final step in a process that had started with the 
introduction of grids in the shrimp fishery in the early 1990s (allegedly a hassle 
primarily for Norwegian fishers since there were more Norwegians than Russians 
involved in this fishery) and which gradually bound Russia – if not formally, then 
in practice – since Russian experts became enthusiastic about grid technology, 
originally a Norwegian invention. The introduction of grids in the cod fishery was 
prepared by the Permanent Committee, where the Russian grid experts partici-
pated. When the proposal reached the Joint Commission for approval, the process 
had allegedly come too far for the Russian delegation leader to say no – again: 
not formally, but in practice. It had become standard operating procedure for the 
Commission to process – and accept – relatively quickly the proposals that came 
from the Permanent Committee.
The introduction of grids in cod fishery was soon drawn into emerging Russian 
complaints that too much had happened too fast in the management of the Barents 
Sea fisheries. As expressed in a newspaper commentary by a former Soviet delega-
tion leader to the Joint Commission in 1999, the Norwegians had taken advantage 
of the temporary weakening of the Russian fisheries bureaucracy following the 
dismantling of the Soviet Union, in order to force new technical regulatory meas-
ure in the Barents Sea that would hit the Russian fleet hardest.55
51. Ibid.
52. Interview in Kirkenes, June 2006.
53. Ibid.
54. Interview in Bergen, May 2006.
55. Murmanskiy vestnik, 18 September 1999.
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The Norwegian delegation leader during most of the 1990s (including 1998) 
referred to this period as “good times in the Commission”.56 His successor had 
a rude awakening in 1999: not only did ICES recommend a fivefold reduction 
in the TAC for cod; the Russians now declared that they had “not a single fish to 
give away”.57 For the first time in the Commission’s history, the session was tem-
porarily interrupted. As we saw above, the agreed TAC was closer to the Russian 
than to the Norwegian preference, but the difficult situation at the 1999 session 
paved the way for new departures: first a three-year quota in 2000 and then the 
harvest control rule in 2002. The head of the Norwegian delegation stressed the 
connection between what happened in 1999, 2000 and 2002 in an interview with 
me several years later:
In 1999, we gave rather much on the Norwegian side in order to get a solution. It 
wasn’t irresponsible, but we had wanted a lower quota. […] The Norwegian goal 
was already then to achieve long-term management strategies, to get the setting of 
the TAC ‘automatized’. This first led to the three-year quota; the Russians accepted 
that, we had a good discussion about it. In order to move forward from there we 
established the Basic Document Working Group, which was given a concrete as-
signment [in 2001]. Their report [from 2002] gave indications, but no answers. [The 
Norwegian Director of Fisheries] and I decided to give it a try. We made the formula 
and spent several hours talking with [the Russian delegation leader]. He eventually 
succeeded in getting [the harvest control rule] anchored in the [Russian] group. He 
gave [a prominent Russian scientist] credit for this.58
The story of how the harvest control rule came about says a good deal about the dy-
namics both within each national delegation and between them. In Norway, there 
was growing awareness of the need for long-term sustainable management prac-
tices. The context was the emergence of precautionary management guidelines in 
ICES and a ‘tougher climate’ in Russia, with the fishing industry acquiring control 
of the Russian delegation to the Joint Commission. Interacting with the scientific 
community, a top civil servant worked out a draft harvest control rule that would 
‘automatize’ the TAC setting, paying attention to both biological sustainability 
and economic viability. He got the Norwegian delegation leader on board and 
they presented the draft rule to the Russian delegation leader in a smaller context 
than the Commission itself, at a preparatory meeting. The chemistry was allegedly 
very good between the two delegation heads at the time, which might have made it 
56. Interview in Kirkenes, June 2006.
57. This became a slogan in the Russian fishery press at the time. See, for instance, Rybnaya 
stolitsa, 15 November 1999.
58. Interview in Oslo, June 2006.
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easier to reach agreement than if the situation had been less advantageous in that 
respect. Obviously, the Russian delegation leader felt the need not only to secure 
legitimacy for the harvest control rule internally in the Russian delegation, but 
even to present the rule as a Russian invention – in itself arguably a sign that he 
did not feel convinced about the rule’s legitimacy in his own delegation, or in the 
Russian fishery complex more widely.
So here we see a line from the Norwegian bureaucracy and scientific community 
up to the head of the Norwegian delegation, via him to the head of the Russian 
delegation and down to the Russian scientific community and possibly the rest 
of the Russian delegation. In technical regulation issues during the 1990s, we 
saw a different pattern: several issues were processed at the technical level in the 
Permanent Committee – and in ad hoc working groups set up by the Committee, 
such as on selection grids and satellite tracking – before being presented to the 
Commission for final approval.
In general, there seems to have been fundamental agreement between the lead-
ing scientific communities on both sides, and a tendency to steer towards agree-
ment in the upper levels of the two delegations. The main obstacle seems to have 
been the Russian fishing industry and actors associated with it, as well as cer-
tain lower levels of the Russian bureaucracy. The most difficult TAC negotiations 
took place in the late 1990s, when the industry had allegedly taken control of the 
Russian delegation. At the most dramatic session, in 1999, the Russian delegation 
was headed by a young businessman without experience from the northern basin, 
who was later accused of economic crime. Here the federal Russian research in-
stitute VNIRO might fall into the category of “actors associated with the Russian 
fishing industry”; at least, that was PINRO’s accusation. As to scientific methods, 
the established collaboration between PINRO and the Norwegian Institute of 
Marine Research functioned as a buffer against disagreement between the higher 
levels of the delegations to the Joint Commission. It would arguably have been 
more difficult for the head of the Russian delegation – to the extent he was subject 
to pressure from VNIRO – to stand up against arguments for a new method for 
estimating the cod stock if the leading Russian research institute on the stocks in 
question had not been wholeheartedly ‘on the Norwegian side’. Russian support 
might not have been the result of strategic endeavours by the Norwegians to get the 
Russian scientists ‘on their side’, but more the consequence of Norwegian efforts 
to include the Russians in the multilateral scientific community.
The outcome was less favourable for the Norwegians in the overfishing issue 
during the 2000s. Here the good relations built up between the enforcement bod-
ies of the two countries during the 1990s did not pay off in the form of Russian 
support for the Norwegian initiative to investigate the consequences of increased 
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transhipments at sea. Members of the upper levels in the Norwegian delegation 
tend to express themselves diplomatically, as the delegation leader did in an in-
terview with me in 2006: “The Russians acknowledge the overfishing, but they 
don’t present any figures. They’re not aggressive or anything like that. They un-
derstand that there has been a Russian overfishing; they just don’t know how large 
it’s been.”59 Long-time members of the Norwegian delegation to the Permanent 
Committee expressed disappointment about Russian lack of initiative in reveal-
ing and punishing those who overfish.60 The Norwegians gave top priority to the 
Commission’s working group on enforcement, while the Russians sent low-level 
civil servants to the meetings. In the end the Russians decided not to follow up on 
suspicions of overfishing, so the Norwegians had to go it alone.
The Russian Federal Border Service started to cooperate actively with Norwegian 
authorities on the overfishing issue around 2005. A total of 53 investigated cases 
were forwarded from the Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries to the Russian au-
thorities. All 24 cases originating in the Russian EEZ, where the Border Service is 
responsible, were followed up. However, there was no response on the remaining 
29 cases.61 These concerned violations outside the Russian EEZ, where the Russian 
civilian enforcement authorities were in charge. The latter even withheld data 
about landings in Norway from the Russian Federal Border Service. A civil servant 
at the Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries explained in an interview with me that 
neither the introduction nor the implementation of the joint Norwegian–Russian 
method for estimating the total catch, adopted in 2009, has been straightforward.62 
Norway and Russia interpret the method’s provisions about transparency differ-
ently. The joint method requires each party to present ‘prepared material’ about 
transhipments, transport and deliveries of fish. The Norwegians interpreted this 
to the effect that there was to be full transparency in all basic documentation. The 
Russians, however, presented their final analysis and refused the Norwegians ac-
cess to the basic documentation. The argument was that it contained restricted 
material from other state agencies, such as the customs authorities. As a conse-
59. Interview in Oslo, June 2006.
60. For example, in a newspaper interview the leader of the enforcement section at the Norwegian 
Directorate of Fisheries, who has been a member of the Permanent Committee since its estab-
lishment, complained that the Russians were not willing to share satellite tracking data with 
the Norwegians, as they had promised in the Joint Commission that they would do: “I have 
the impression that Russia doesn’t prioritize this. I also think it’s fair to say there’s a lack of 
will on the Russian side. Instead of doing what we’ve agreed to do, there’s unwillingness to 
implement measures.” (Nordlys, 23 June 2006)




quence, my respondent indicated, one cannot be 100 per cent sure that overfish-
ing has in fact been eliminated.63 The Norwegians thus had to detour through a 
multilateral organization (NEAFC) in order to get structures created that could 
eliminate the possibility for Russian fishers to deliver fish illegally. In this case, 
the lower levels of the Russian fisheries bureaucracy allegedly sided more with 
their own country’s fishing industry (or corrupt elements in the fisheries admin-
istration) than with similar institutions in Norway. The upper echelons on the 
Russian side arguably lacked initiative, but enforcement is – unlike the setting of 
TAC – traditionally handled at lower administrative levels. This situation changed 
somewhat around 2007–2008, when the federal Russian authorities – up to the 
level of the president – started a campaign to combat illegal fishing activities in 
Russia (Jørgensen, 2009). This coincided with the elimination of overfishing in the 
Barents Sea, and was more directed towards the far eastern Russian fishery basin 
than the country’s northwest.
6. Conclusions
Norway tried to get Russia to take overfishing seriously on two occasions, first 
in the early 1990s, then in the mid-2000s. On the first occasion, the Russian side 
was quickly convinced that overfishing did in fact constitute a problem, and en-
tered into new collaborative arrangements with Norway in the enforcement of the 
Barents Sea fisheries. In the 2000s, however, the Russian response was lukewarm. 
Nevertheless, agreement was reached in 2009 on a joint method for assessing the 
total catch from the Barents Sea. In the meantime, the 2007 NEAFC port-state 
control regime had largely solved the problem of overfishing in the Barents Sea, 
although Russia has remained unwilling to present the basic documentation about 
Russian transhipments to Norway, and there is uncertainty about Russian readi-
ness to prosecute violators. Norway had more success in getting the Russians on 
board when it came to the coordination of technical regulation measures, the 
joint introduction of new regulations and the ‘automatization’ of the setting of the 
TAC. This was possible because Norway did not simply leave implementation of 
Russia’s international commitments to Russia itself, but engaged actively in post-
agreement bargaining.
As a point of departure, one might expect such bargaining to take place be-
tween the parties ‘over the table’ – in this case, at plenary sessions of the Joint 
Commission. In practice, I have identified two other main tracks of Norwegian 




and bargaining by the two heads of delegation, with decisions subsequently an-
chored in the respective delegations. Many issues have been negotiated and agreed 
upon in the Permanent Committee and its sub-groups before being presented to 
the Commission for final approval. This was the case with the joint introduction 
of new regulatory measures like selection grids and satellite tracking around the 
turn of the millennium, and with more recent initiatives like the joint method for 
estimating total outtake of fish from 2009. In these cases, the challenge of reach-
ing agreement between the two states was in practice handed over to technical 
experts (civil servants at lower levels or scientists). If the role of the Commission 
was not formally reduced to rubberstamping, in practice at least the agreements 
reached at lower levels were routinely accepted by the Commission. In a somewhat 
related manner, the established scientific collaboration between PINRO and the 
Norwegian Institute of Marine Research functioned as a buffer against the intro-
duction of the new Russian methods for estimation of fish stocks that were advo-
cated by the federal research institute VNIRO but did not meet ICES standards for 
precautionary fisheries management. Here fundamental agreement on scientific 
principles had evolved over many years between Norwegian and Russian scien-
tists under the auspices of ICES. Norway had intensified its support to PINRO, 
also financially, after the break-up of the Soviet Union. Whereas the Norwegian 
intentions were more altruistic – including Russia in the international scientific 
community – this investment could be ‘cashed in’ by leading Russian scientists 
showing support in the Joint Commission for Norway’s position on new methods 
of stock assessment. But there were also risks associated with efforts to influence 
the lower levels of the Russian bureaucracy. The ease with which the Permanent 
Committee reached agreement allegedly led to suspicion in Moscow: were these 
scientists and civil servants defending Russian interests, or were they becoming too 
friendly with the Norwegians? Similarly, PINRO was, at least indirectly, suspected 
of running the errand of Western interests, and found itself squeezed financially 
and challenged scientifically by VNIRO.
The other main track of argumentation that I identified was direct communica-
tion between the two heads of delegation – mostly with their respective interpret-
ers, or sometimes just the two of them, and on occasion in the Commission’s ‘inner 
circle’. The TAC has always been handled at this level, and not in plenary sessions. 
The same goes for many other important decisions, such as the introduction of new 
procedures – although, as we have seen, some new procedures were introduced 
through agreement at lower levels and then approved by the Commission. Around 
the turn of the millennium, the Norwegians worked consistently to prepare the 
ground for the 2002 harvest control rule. First, they yielded rather much in the dif-
ficult negotiations in 1999 in order to ‘keep the Russians happy’. Next, they got the 
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Russians on board with a three-year quota in 2000, an arrangement that included 
elements of the ensuing harvest control rule. And we saw how, in the final stages 
before the harvest control rule was adopted, the Norwegian delegation leader and 
the Norwegian Director of Fisheries ‘worked on’ the Russian delegation leader, first 
at a preparatory meeting, then in the Commission itself, to get him to accept the 
new rule. Once the rule was adopted, the head of the Russian delegation credited 
it to his own scientists, presumably to reduce any impression of the harvest control 
rule as being a Norwegian invention.
My Norwegian interviewees, who were high-ranking members of the Norwegian 
delegation to the Joint Commission and the Permanent Committee, agreed that 
Norway had been the leading force in the collaboration, at least after the break-
up of the Soviet Union. As a result, they saw the need to create ownership to the 
proposed measures on the Russian side. This was done by meticulous and per-
sistent arguments, and by taking things ‘in several rounds’, from lower levels to 
the Commission itself. The introduction of selection grids was an example of a 
step-by-step process that gradually bound the Russians, if not formally, then in 
practice. First, selection grids were introduced in the shrimp fishery, which was 
mainly a nuisance to the Norwegian fishers, since they were more involved in that 
fishery than the Russians were. This, however, sparked the interest of Russian sci-
entists and technical experts in the grid technology, and talks ensued about the 
possible use of grids also in the cod fishery. Practical exploration of the technology 
followed. By the time the technical experts had agreed first in a sub-group to the 
Permanent Committee and then in the Committee itself, the Russians had alleg-
edly ‘come too far’ to pull out. This turn of events might have been unintended 
from the Norwegian side, but it serves to fill in the picture of negotiation dynamics 
in the Norwegian–Russian fisheries relations.
Post-agreement bargaining theory is not well refined, so the contribution of 
my study is mainly to provide empirical evidence and suggest pathways that such 
bargaining might follow, how Norway went about getting it done (Spector and 
Zartman, 2003). In the Joint Commission, Russia found itself in an institutional 
web of increasingly more elaborate decision-making procedures, geared largely 
towards compromise. Post-agreement bargaining was the practical tool employed 
by Norway to get new measures and procedures implemented. In line with Chayes 
and Chayes,64 instances of apparent non-compliance were regarded as ‘problems to 
be solved, rather than as wrongs to be punished’. The overfishing of the early 1990s 
was halted after only a few years. Technical regulations were coordinated between 
the two countries, and selection grids and satellite tracking were jointly intro-
64. Chayes and Chayes 1995, p. 109.
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duced. TACs were brought closer to ICES scientific advice through Norwegian 
bargaining, and the harvest control rule was adopted. Russian overfishing was 
most probably discontinued towards the end of the first decade of the twenty-first 
century. And the alternative models for stock estimation never even made it to 
the protocols of the Joint Commission, although it was more a long-term effect of 
Norwegian politics that reduced the need for more immediate post-agreement bar-
gaining. While we cannot say for certain that these decisions were ‘right’, at least 
they brought the management of the Barents Sea fisheries closer to the standards 
around which international science – and politics – converge.
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